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 HOW LOGIC SPEAKS
One of Hilary Putnam’s most profound and important essays, “Rethinking Mathematical 
Necessity”, was inspired, he tells us, by a desire to understand an idea of young Wittgenstein’s 
(henceforth YW),
an intuition that I had never shared. For the early Wittgenstein it was 
somehow clear that logical truths do not really say anything … (1994: 
246)
Whereas it had seemed clear to Putnam that
sentences of pure logic are statements with content … ; if proved, they 
are moreover true statements, and their negations false statements. 
(Ibid)
!e initial problem was to understand what YW could have meant by this. !e route Putnam 
found to an answer went through an idea he found in Kant:
Logic is not a description of what holds true in “metaphysically possible 
worlds’, to use Kripke’s phrase. It is a doctrine of the form of coherent 
thought. Even if I think of what turns out to be a “metaphysically 
impossible world”, my thought would not be a thought at all unless it 
conforms to logic. (1994: 247)
How to understand this idea? Does it mean that what is, in fact, a law of logic simply could 
not have failed to be no matter how the world were? Kant, as Putnam reads him, tells us:
!e negation of a logical truth is, in a sense, unthinkable; and it is 
unthinkable precisely because it is the negation of a logical truth. 
Explanation goes no further. (1994: 255)
Trivially, thought, or its logic, could not have turned out to be such that ‘blah’ where that 
‘blah’ is unthinkable: there is as yet no way it could have turned out. But then, exactly what 
sort of notion is unthinkable? Here, then, is Putnam’s concluding way with the ‘Kantian’ idea:
My suggestion is not, of course, that we retain this idea of a nature of 
thought (or judgment, or the ideal language) which metaphysically 
guarantees the unrevisability of logic. But what I am inclined to keep 
from this story is the idea that logical truths do not have negations that 
we (presently) understand. It is not that we can say that the theorems of 
classical logic are “unrevisable”; it is that the question “Are they 
 revisable?” is one which we have not yet succeeded in giving a sense. 
(1994: 256)
!is, I will argue, is just the right way with it—as one can see in comparing Frege with YW.
1. Sätze and Gedanke: In 1919 Frege wrote,
What is distinctive about my conception of logic is "rst recognisable by 
the fact that I place the content of the word ‘true’ in lead position, and 
then by the fact that I let thoughts follow immediately as those things 
by which being true can come into question at all. (1919: 273)
To grasp Frege’s conception of logic, then, one must grasp his notion of a thought. Perhaps 
the most striking thing about that notion is its contrast with something like Russell’s 
(early-20th century) conception of a proposition, inherited YW’s of a Satz.
Russell, and YW, thought of a proposition (or Satz in relevant sense) as something 
sentence-like in ways a thought in Frege’s sense is not. Sentences, or at least sentences of a 
language, have two conspicuous features. First, they have some perceivable form (visual, 
auditory, whatever); a form by which they are recognisable as the sentences they are (without 
resort to knowledge as to what it is they say). !ey are the sorts of things suitable for work as 
vehicles in the expression of our thought; content-bearers. Second, a sentence is something 
structured—syntactically, and thereby semantically—in some one particular way (bracketing 
ambiguity). For our purposes (and Russell’s and YW’s), a sentence can be thought of as 
generated from a given vocabulary by given syntactic rules—ones by which inde"nitely many 
di#erent sentences are generable from that given vocabulary. It is structured by its derivation 
in the relevant syntax. Its semantics—what it means, or as such, says—is structured 
accordingly. !e English sentence ‘Penguins waddle’, for example, speaks of penguins and 
describes them as waddlers. It is intrinsic to it to do this. A sentence, thus, belongs to a system 
of sentences. !at system as a whole is structured by what generates it. !e structure of a 
given sentence locates it in that system. One, if not the main task of a syntax is to identify each 
sentence within some given language. To do that is to assign that sentence some structure 
which is its alone; thus which distinguishes it from every other sentence generated, and, given 
the complexity of structure here, marks the syntactically (and semantically) relevant 
similarities between it and given ranges of other sentences which it is marked as resembling.)
It is sometimes unclear whether Russell or YW made that "rst feature of sentences part 
of their conceptions of a proposition. Both certainly exploited the second. Every proposition 
is to be conceived as having some unique representational structure. It is some particular 
structured way of representing things as some way there is for things to be. So it has (to 
adumbrate) a unique logical form. Every proposition belongs to a system of propositions, in 
which its structure positions it, and by which it shares features with given ranges of other 
propositions. (Wittgenstein espoused this view as late as January 1930. Cf. Waismann, 1979: 
89-90.) For both, such relations between propositions are to be the very foundation of logic.
Frege’s notion of a thought, however, "ts neither of these ideas. It is essential to a 
thought that it is something invisible (not perceivable by the senses). One reason for this is 
that a thought is to be precisely that by which truth can come into question at all. It is thus to 
 be identi"ed by just those features, and no more, which identify something on which truth is 
liable to depend. And whether it is true that penguins waddle does not turn on whether a 
sentence which so says is written in lower case or capitals. !e second idea above—what is 
most essential to Russell’s and YW’s, notions of proposition—collides, for a start, with Frege’s 
insistence that whole thoughts come "rst. We do not, he tells us, begin with concepts and put 
them together so as to construct a thought. Rather concepts arise through the decomposition 
of thoughts. It is a central part of this idea that the same thought can be decomposed in many 
di#erent ways; that semantically, and structurally, di#ering sentences can all be expressions of 
the same thought. As Frege also puts it,
I do not think that for each judgeable content there is just one manner 
in which it can be decomposed, or that one of the possible manners 
may always claim an objective priority. (1882: 118)
(‘Judgeable content’ was Frege’s "rst try at the notion ‘thought’ (‘Gedanke’) came to stand for.)
Grasping Frege’s notion of a decomposition is made easier by conceiving a thought in 
terms of its de"ning task: to bring truth into question; to make it turn in some determinate 
way on how things are. Like any task, this one can be broken down into sub-tasks. Serving the 
drinks can be broken down into serving the martinis, serving the mai tais, serving the 
margaritas, serving the mojitos, etc. Or it can be broken down into "lling cocktail shakers, 
shaking them, dusting rims of glasses, pouring, etc. Similarly, making truth turn on whether 
Sid waddles can be broken down into making truth turn (in part) on how Sid is and making it 
turn (in part) on what waddles. Or it can be broken down into making truth turn on whether 
the concept being a waddler is satis"ed by everything which satis"es the concept, being that 
very item, Sid. And, I stress, so on. For a set of subtasks to be a decomposition is just for their 
joint performance to be (no more nor less than) performing the whole thought’s task.
A thought-element, on this way of thinking, is, "rst of all, an element of some 
decomposition of a thought, and then an element of it on that decomposition. For it to be an 
element on that decomposition is for it to be part of some set of subtasks which, jointly, just 
are that whole thought. No more is required of a decomposition for it to be a decomposition 
than just said. Such is what opens the door to multiple decompositions.
Making truth turn in a particular way on how things are is not like serving drinks in all 
respects. In the last case, one can parcel out the tasks: Pia mixes the martinis, Sid serves them. 
For a thought there is no parallel parcelling out of (proper) subtasks. Making truth turn on 
what waddles can only be done at all as part of making truth tout court turn on how things 
are. !ere is no such thing as making truth turn in part on how things are, punkt. If Pia "lls 
the shakers and Sid omits to shake, at least we have full shakers. To make truth turn on what 
waddles and omit to do the rest would be to do nothing at all.
If Sid gets a Lego set for Christmas, he might build a garage. Pia may then decompose it 
into parts. Or her nephew, !or, might just oblige. !or’s parts may be very di#erent from 
what Pia’s would have been. None of his would have "t together with any of hers. You can 
break up a Lego model in many di#erent ways into sub-parts. But—assuming there are no 
plastic shards about—there is one decomposition of the garage that may claim objective 
priority. It is the decomposition of the garage into those parts in which the Lego set came. 
!is is the sort of decomposition one expects of a friend when he returns the Lego set he 
borrowed. Some philosophers have understood Frege’s idea of multiple decomposability on 
 this Lego model. Such is not Frege’s idea.
Between about 1902 and 1904 Frege and Russell debated Frege’s notion of Sinn. A 
thought is one sort—the central sort—of Sinn. So they were debating, inter alia, Frege’s notion 
of a thought. Russell rejected that idea. He (and then YW) preferred their notions of 
proposition. One notorious point of disagreement concerned whether objects—Sid, or Mont 
Blanc—could themselves be thought-elements. As Russell seemed to understand this issue, 
the crucial question was whether the relation between thought-elements which made a 
thought about an object and the object the thought would thus be of was, or could, be many-
one. Russell also seemed to think that Frege’s case for Sinn was banking on this being many 
one. Perhaps Frege invited such misunderstanding. Perhaps he was occasionally unclear in his 
own mind on the point. (See, e.g., 1906.) But this is a misunderstanding. !e trouble with Mt. 
Blanc, shared by Sid and the foam on Pia’s cappuccino, is that neither these things nor 
anything to be found in investigating them, can make truth turn on anything. Nor is Sid a way 
for truth to turn on anything. !e truth of a thought may well turn, inter alia, on how Sid is. 
But then the relevant element would be one which made the thought do this. Such an element 
would not be Sid. He is the wrong sort for such feats.
Frege did think that the relation in question is, in general, many-one. But the existence 
of Sinne depends on no such fact. Rather, many-oneness serves a di#erent end here. Facts as 
to where there is one thought, where two, need to mesh with facts as to where there is need 
for proof (and then what proof). If the thought that A is the thought that B, then, trivially, 
anything which is proof of A is proof of B. So there had better be di#erent thoughts wherever 
proof of B from A would not be immediate, or wherever some proof of A might fail to be 
proof of B. We might look at arithmetic, for example, to see where proof of one thing from 
another, or of one thing, but not yet of another, would need to be recognised. Such will settle, 
for arithmetic, just where there are two arithmetical thoughts, where one. For Frege the bare 
notion of a thought should leave it open for arithmetic to settle such questions. Similarly for 
other areas of thought. In general, as he puts the point,
!e principles of concepts, and of judgements, serve only as preparation 
for the theory of consequence. (Kernsatz 14 (Nachgelassene Schri"en, p. 
190))
Such, I think, is one of Frege’s greatest insights.
Compare thoughts and propositions on this point. When are two di#erent 
decompositions of a thought (each a decomposition of some thought) a decomposition of the 
same thought? For Frege di#erent decompositions, each of some thought, are to be 
recognised as decompositions of the same thought where needed so as to represent correctly 
the facts as to what would be proof of what. !at a thought is decomposed in some one way 
cannot on its own determine what another decomposition of that very thought might be. Nor 
does the notion of a thought provide us per se with any e#ective condition on thought-
identity. Contrast this with the answer to the question when two decompositions of a 
proposition would be decompositions of the same thing. Excluding the Lego model of 
decomposition, the answer is: only where they decompose it in the same way. A proposition is 
identi"ed as the proposition that it is by a particular decomposition: that which decomposes 
it into the structure assigned it by its generation in the system to which it belongs. !e 
structure thus assigned it identi"es it as the one it is in the same way that the structure the 
 syntax of a language assigns a sentence in generating it identi"es that sentence as the one it is.
!us, when YW tells us, 
!at the truth of one proposition follows from that of others, we see in 
the structure of the propositions. (5.13)
He is telling us that, for any stock of questions of truth—ways there are of making truth turn 
on how things are—there can be no identifying which questions, or ways of turning, these are 
without ipso facto answering the question what, within the stock, would be proof of what. For 
YW, whatever allowed truth to come into question at all—any actual determinate way for 
truth to come into question—could, per se, allow for only one role for what was thus in 
question in the phenomenon of proving and being proved.
It is just this idea of a unique way of generating any given proposition which, I hope to 
show, Putnam cannot accept. In his rejecting it we "nd his deepest insight about the 
inevitability (such as it is) of logic.
2. Frege’s Logical Insights: Frege tells us two or three crucial things as to what logic is. First, 
he tells us,
!e meaning of the word ‘true’ is unfolded in the laws of being true. 
(1918: 59)
Second, he tells us,
How must I think to reach the goal truth? We expect logic to give the 
answer to this question, but we do not require of it that it delve into the 
particularities of each area of knowledge and its objects; rather we only 
assign it the task of  setting out the most general things which hold for 
all areas of thought. … We can thus also say: Logic is the science of the 
most general laws of being true. (1897: 139)
!ird, there is a suggestion in Frege of what sort of generality might be involved in such 
references to ‘the most general.’
First, then, the laws of being true (or laws of truth) are arrived at in unfolding the 
concept true (unde"nable, in a sense, but not thereby altogether without content). !ey are 
laws which hold simply in virtue of what being true is per se. Which tells us something as to 
how to understand Frege’s second idea. He frames it in terms of what one might see as logic’s 
universality, or topic-neutrality. Logic, the idea is, tells us how to think insofar as such advice 
applies to, and holds for, all thinking whatever, no matter what it is about. So its maxims 
contain no restrictions on the sort of thought to which they apply. Hence logic tells us only 
that much as to how to reach truth which is contained in what it would be, as such, for 
something to be true. Since the interest here is in aiming at truth, logic would be centrally 
concerned with relations between the truth of some thoughts and the truth of others; here 
centrally with truth-preservation. !e sort in question would be that ensured simply by truth’s 
 very nature—by what being true is essentially. Such is a way of understanding the idea of 
topic-neutrality. It is also a clue to what shape, for Frege, logic would take.
What content is there in the bare idea of being true? One strand concerns a certain 
objectivity. (“Logic begins with the conviction that there is a distinction between truth and 
falsehood.” (Kernsatz 12) !ere is a thought—a question of truth—just where it can be 
“grasped as the same” by di#erent thinkers, and, thus, agreed to or disputed. (Cf. 1919: 146) 
Where there is a thought, it is true, or false, independent of who thinks it or whether it is 
thought. (Cf., e.g., 1918: 69). Frege’s propositional logic is simply a development of this idea. 
A thought is, or at least aims to be, either true or false. !us, the set of functions from truth-
values, or pairs thereof, to a truth-value will identify all the ways in a thought may be 
compounded out of others whose truth-values determine its. For each such function there is a 
logical form formable from any thought, or pair, according as the function takes singletons or 
pairs as arguments, where what has that form has the value true just where that function 
maps the values of its elements, so formed, into the value true. Propositional logic just maps 
truth-preservation across such forms.
Frege’s news was as to how logic could look inside whole thoughts. !ere is such a thing 
as a thought of an object that it is thus and so—a thought which so decomposes—only where 
there is an object it is thus of. For the thought to be true is then for that object to be as (so 
decomposed) the thought represents some particular object to be. Suppose we present the 
form a thought assumes when so decomposed by, say, the symbols F(a) (as Frege notes, as we 
would typically present the logical form of a (mathematical) function. !en, extracting the 
form-element F( ) from that whole, we can introduce a new logical constant to combine with 
that element to form a new logical form. We might write it, e.g., ‘ExF(x)’. !e basic truth-
preserving properties of a thought of that form (insofar as part of what being true is per se) 
would be: such a thought follows from any thought of the corresponding form, F(a) (I here 
omit details of what ‘corresponding’ is to mean); if, the role of ‘F( )’ remaining "xed, G 
follows from any thought which shares the form ‘F(a)’ stands in for, then G follows from 
ExF(x). Now, if you like, introduce a further way of completing ‘F( )’—write it, say, ‘AxF(x)’—
whose basic truth-preserving properties are that it both follows from and is entailed by not-
Ex-notF(x)—letting ‘not’ here stand for a standard negation operator. With which we have 
recognised (at "rst-order) those logic forms of concern to logic which one discovers by 
looking inside whole thoughts.
Where logic’s laws are expressed in that special way a calculus does this, the relevant 
properties of those just-indicated constants in logical forms will be made recognisable 
syntactically. !e relevant rules for constructing logical forms for proof, though, are meant to 
correspond to certain facts of truth-preservation. In the propositional case, e.g., to the facts of 
when truth would be preserved moving from two thoughts to a compounding of them which 
took on the value true just when both of them did, and from such a compound to some 
further thought. In the quanti"cational case, in the way just indicated.
!ere is a logic—a construction of a special sort. And there is logic—what a logic aims 
to have represented rightly. Logic—the topic to be represented rightly—has its laws, just as, 
e.g., mechanics does. For Frege these are the laws of the phenomenon of being true (notably 
laws of truth-preservation). If there is a topic here, there might also be a theory of it. A theory 
would mention the key items that the laws govern—such things as quanti"ers, or 
quanti"cation. It would treat the same phenomenon as a logic does. But it would be 
answerable to this in a very di#erent way. !e above is a somewhat tedious expansion on—if 
 you like, informal theory of—that to which a logic, or a theory of logic is answerable, each in 
its own way. !e point of the expansion is to begin to point to the di#erent strands which 
make up the notions logic treats of; notions of that of which its laws are to hold. Multiple core 
ideas interact here. !ere are ideas of objectivity. !ere is the idea of truth’s bipolarity. !ere is 
an idea of a certain universality and authority to logic—of thought as something per se 
governed by given laws, no matter what, or when, or by whom, the thought is. Such a tangle 
of threads at least begins to make truth a notion of just that sort about which Putnam has had 
so much to say.
!ere remains Frege’s third idea. Laws of logic, since universal, have a speci"c sort of 
generality. !ey have consequences for the ways any thought relates to others. Frege o#ers a 
way of understanding the generality of a thought. On this understanding, generality is to be 
attained through quanti"cation. Where a thought has some speci"c content—e.g., where it si 
decomposable into making truth turn on how Sid is, and on who smokes—one can move 
from it to a thought without that content by replacing that element (in relevant 
decompositions) with a quanti"er. If the thought is that Sid waddles, one moves in the right 
direction by thus moving to a thought that something waddles (or that everything does). One 
continues in the right direction by moving from there to the thought that something (or 
everything) does something (or everything). Eventually, the idea is, one reaches a point where 
there are no more such moves to be made. One would then have attained to a most general 
thought, on this understanding of generality. Frege’s idea of universality is o$en read as the 
idea that laws of logic (or of truth) belong to the realm of most general thoughts in this sense.
3. YW On Logic: !e instigation to our present exploration was YW’s idea that logical 
‘truths’ (if such they really are) say nothing. YW, in fact, means several di#erent things by 
this. !e most plausible of these turns au fond on the notion of representing-as. YW, though, 
puts it in slightly di#erent terms:
In tautology the conditions on agreement with the world—the 
representing relations—cancel each other out, so that it stands in no 
representing relation to reality. (1922: 4.462)
It is the distinctive mark of a logical proposition that one can recognise 
in the symbol alone that it is true; and this fact contains the whole 
philosophy of logic. (1922: 6.113)
Consider the relation of representing-as. One might see this as three-place: in the "rst place 
there is a representer—even if, sometimes, only a stand-in for one in the form of something 
like a thought or a proposition; in the second place, something which is represented as 
something or other—in the main cases so far, either things or a thing; in the third place, that 
which what is in the second place is represented as (being)—in those main cases, some way 
there is for things, or for a thing, to be. In a normal case where there is a question of 
representing truly or falsely, truth value is a cooperative enterprise: the third term in the 
relation "xes how truth is to turn on the second term—what is demanded of this second term 
if there is to be truth; the second term, how things are, delivers the outcome of such turning. 
Normally, the various elements in the relevant thought, or proposition, each contribute 
 substantially to forming some substantial demand on what occupies the second place. But 
suppose that instead of this, in YW’s terms, those would-be partial demands contained in 
these elements ‘cancel each other out’, so that really no demand is placed by the third term on 
the second. So that, in YW’s more metaphorical terms, one can recognise in the third term 
itself that the would-be representing (if either true or false) must be true—or, again, must be 
false. !en there is no real role for the second term here. It makes no di#erence at all how, or 
what, it is. It might as well be anything. !e result is already determined. Such, if it happened, 
would be a plausible case for mere schein-representing-as; a case where nothing was really 
represented as anything. Perhaps there was a schein-occupier of the second place in the 
relation. But at best we have only a degenerate case of the obtaining of this relation.
Putnam suggests that this e#ect of cancelling out shows up only in unembedded items 
of relevant forms, not in embedded ones. One thing this suggests is that cancelling out has to 
do more with force than simply with content. More generally, though, it suggests that 
cancelling out is somehow all relevant to context, on some notion of context (yet to be 
explored); that cancelling out is not something which that which brings truth into question (a 
thought or a propositions) does as such. !is more generally suggestion points in the 
direction in which we are now headed.
But YW also o#ers another account of of saying nothing. Such turns more patently on 
what is peculiar to a proposition as opposed to a thought in Frege’s sense, though YW seems 
to see it as merely continuous with the "rst idea, above. 6.1222 expresses it as follows:
Not only must a proposition of logic be incapable of refutation by any 
possible experience, but it must also be incapable of being  con"rmed 
by any such.
If propositions were what brought truth into question, these two ideas might fuse. For if what 
brought truth into question was what was identi"ed, per se, by a proposition’s structure, then 
wherever truth was borne on, eo ipso what was borne on could not be the same proposition as 
any whose structure cancelled out demands on truth as per above. !e ideas separate, though, 
if what brings truth into question is a thought. Putnam showed us why they must: there is no 
such legislating of a question of truth what will, what not, matter to its answer.
A law of logic would be absolutely impervious to worldly bearing on its truth if it merely 
re%ected structure which made the thoughts which had it the thoughts they are. !ere could 
not fail to be thoughts so structured. !e law could not fail to apply to them. YW this idea in 
6.341-6.342 by comparison of logic with what I will call a special system. Such a system 
generates a stock of propositions from given vocabulary by given syntax. !e structure thus 
assigned to each such proposition distinguishes it from any other proposition in the system—
or from any tout court: to be that proposition is to have that structure; to be it is to be 
generated by that system. (Compare English sentences.) So that structure, with the contrasts 
it makes with other propositions, identi"es the content of that proposition as what it is 
(identi"es the question of truth thus posed). !e system need not generate all propositions. 
!e structure it assigns its may be largely proprietary. It yields a particular scheme for 
describing things; one, perhaps, among many possible. Its concern may be some particular 
subject matter. Now the crucial idea is this. On the whole, the system generates propositions 
whose parts do not cancel each other out. !ese are genuine descriptions of the world. But it 
may also generate, or "x, ones whose parts do cancel out in the above-scouted sense. !ese 
 merely tell us what system we are dealing with; what content the "rst-mentioned propositions 
have in relating to each other as the syntax of the system makes them do. !e illuminating 
comparison is to be between such proprietary dicta of a special system and laws of logic.
YW o#ers two examples. !e "rst is a hypothetical system for describing black and 
white patterns on a white wall. In the system such are described in terms of a (notional) net. 
!e net consists of labelled cells of a particular size and shape (say, hexagonal). (A label might 
be a pair of coordinates for row and column.) A description in the system supposes this net 
placed over the wall in a particular orientation. It is then a conjunction, each conjunct pairing 
a cell-label with one of the descriptions, ‘black’, or ‘white’. A rule of the system is, say, that a 
cell is to be paired with ‘black’ just in case it is at least 50% black; otherwise white. Such "xes 
when a given description within the system would be true of a given wall. For any given wall, 
the system might also generate, for each cell, ψ, in the net, the (would-be) proposition, ‘ψ is 
not both black and white’. Or it might generate a generalisation of this, such as ‘no cell of this 
wall is both black and white’, or, still more generally, ‘there is never a cell of any wall which is 
both black and white’. But such would-be propositions would say nothing as to how any white 
wall was in re being black-patterned. !ese pseudo-propositions merely "x how this 
particular scheme for describing walls works. !ey help identify the content of a genuine 
proposition such as ‘… & <<17,39>, black> …’; what it says, insofar as to say this is just what 
it is to be the proposition in question. !us, the idea is, the pseudo proposition is in no way 
liable to proving false.
YW’s second example of a special system is Newtonian mechanics. Here the Newtonian 
laws and de"nitions are the pseudo-propositions. For example, the (would-be) proposition, 
‘Momentum is mass times velocity’, merely tells us how the terms of the system describe, just 
as with the would-be proposition, ‘No cell of any wall is both black and white.’ On the other 
hand, ‘!at six-pack is traveling towards that windshield with momentum 200 m/hr/kg’. as 
generated by the ‘Newtonian special system’, is a genuine proposition. Refer to the Newtonian 
laws to see what it says.
!e comparison is thus between laws of logic and the dicta of special systems. What is 
the comparison to be? One might (not entirely plausibly) think of the laws of logic as 
generated by, or by-products of, some vocabulary and syntax which generates all special 
systems. Or, less implausibly, one might think of them as things generated in generating any 
consistent system of propositions, or perhaps under some suitable closure of it (say, under 
suitable compoundings of propositions, and operations on sub-propositional parts). In any 
case, the idea would be that the laws of logic are pseudo-propositions in the same way that 
pseudo-propositions of special systems are. !ey are simply part of what "xes how any system 
of propositions is to work; or that structure, or content, of any proposition which is "xed 
independent of to what special system it belongs. Hence (the thought is) they are as 
impervious to being proven false (or true, for that matter) by vicissitudes of history as are the 
dicta of special systems.
!e comparison, though, founders at at least two points. First (borrowing again from 
Frege), it misconstrues the nature of the authority laws of logic can claim over our thought. 
Second, it misconstrues the way in which it is open to a special system to identify those 
questions of truth towards which we stand. If the "rst point is not Putnam’s in particular, the 
second certainly is. First point. To conceive of dicta of special systems as immune to worldly 
bearing, as YW suggests, is to conceive of them as something like stipulations: the 
descriptions of this system are to work thus. In the system a cell is to be called black just 
 case there is at least as much black in it as white. In another system, perhaps, not. And one 
could describe patterns on walls in a system that did not so work at all. Similarly YW 
suggests, one can capture mechanical phenomena in Newtonian mechanics, in terms of its 
physical quantities, or, if you prefer, within a di#erent system in terms of others. Or, omitting 
to speak of mechanics, one can, as one cannot for logic, duvk being subject to any mechanical 
dicta at all. 
By contrast, If the wall has a black spot and the six-pack is hurtling towards the 
windshield, then the six-pack is hurtling, no matter what the special system. Nor can one 
stipulate whether a conjunction is to be taken to entail its conjuncts; nor whether any 
particular thoughts we think are conjoinable. Nor would such room for stipulation "t with 
Frege’s, and YW’s idea that there is no such thing as illogical thought (an empty idea if one 
can stipulate how thoughts are to behave).
Second point. It is simply not true that momentum is mass times velocity. In thinking 
that momentum is mass times velocity, one cannot be thinking something which could be 
made true by placing it in some special system. No proposition of any system that would 
decribe the mechanics of the world could connect momentum, mass and velocity in that way. 
Which means that to think that momentum is mass times velocity, whatever this might be, 
could not be simply to think some given proposition, on YW’s conception of what a 
proposition is. Which brings us to what is most central in Putnam’s thought.
4. Open Questions: !ought and proposition are two rival conceptions of a question of truth. 
Pro tem, abstracting from this disagreement, I will speak simply of questions of truth. A 
question whether the six pack is %ying towards the windshield with such-and-such 
momentum might be one such. !e disputed question is: what identi"es a question of truth as 
the question it is.
Suppose there were some special system, with speci"ed vocabulary and syntax, which 
generated a proposition, Σ, that the six-pack is %ying towards the windshield with momentum 
200μ. To be that proposition would then be, per se, to be structured as that system structures 
Σ. If Σ* is structured di#erently, then, ipso facto, it is not Σ. If Σ identi"ed a question of 
truth—a given way of making truth turn on how things are—then things could be made to 
turn in that way on how things are only in representing structured as Σ is. Σ’s structure would 
be essential to representing in that way. In applying logic’s laws to given discourse we look, in 
"rst instance, for something essentially structured in the way a proposition is to which to 
apply those laws. But this, by itself, does not answer the question that presses here: whether 
the same question of truth might be posed by representing otherwise structured; and if so, 
what sort of structuring might do this. !is question cannot be answered by Σ’s parent special 
system itself. !ere would be no such question if questions of truth were to be counted as 
(YW’s) propositions are. But both Frege and Putnam give reasons why this way of counting 
such questions cannot be right. I will focus on Putnam’s.
Newtonian mechanics de#nes ‘momentum’ as mass times velocity. Why can it not just 
be understood as using that term to speak of something of which this is true? Answer: 
because Newtonian mechanics is, or was, to be understood as thus speaking of a notion to 
which many strands belong. !ese individual strands may prove not to hold together. !e 
Newtonian de"nition is just one such strand. It might prove (and has proven) the one that has 
to go. Among other strands in the Newtonian understanding are: that momentum is a 
physical quantity; that a rigid body has some; that momentum has a certain role in explaining 
 mechanical phenomena. !e de"nition appears not to "t with these others.
More speci"cally, if relativisitic mechanics is right, there can be no physical quantity 
"tting the Newtonian de"nition. On the other hand there is a physical quantity of which all of 
the above would have been being (quite reasonably) supposed before 1905. Now two 
possibilities: ‘momentum’ in Newtonian mechanics referred to nothing; or it referred to this 
last-mentioned physical quantity. On the "rst there is no such thing as momentum; so no 
special system ever spoke of such. On the second, there is such a thing. Many of the above 
strands hold good of it. What Putnam has shown is how the second can be what is correct as 
to what Newtonian mechanics spoke of.
A simple parallel (from another familiar context). I point and say, ‘!e man behind the 
Foster-Grants is on his "$h martini.’ But those ‘Foster Grants’ are really Maui Jims. Nor is 
that ‘man’ actually a man. If I said something, it was of someone. But if I said something of 
someone, that person would not "t the description, ‘behind the Foster Grants’. In fact, if I did 
say something of someone, it is clear who it would be. (Vide my pointing.) So either I said 
nothing of anyone, inclusive the person I clearly meant to speak of, or I said something (false 
if she is wearing Ray Bans) of that person. !e reasonable choice: the last.
What, now, of YW’s Newtonian special system? First, if that the six-pack is %ying with 
momentum M is about momentum, then there is no such proposition in that system. For if it 
is intrinsic to that system to be governed by the Newtonian de"nition, then it is, so far, a 
system for speaking of what could not be a physical quantity at all, whereas momentum is 
one. Second, though, that same question of truth, whether the six-pack has momentum M, 
might have been expressed by a proposition in such a system had Newtonian mechanics 
proved correct. Hence, that question, while identi"ed with a particular thought in Frege’s 
sense, cannot be identi"ed as such with any proposition in YW’s. Moreover, if we understand 
it as intrinsic to YW’s system that it is a system of descriptions for mechanical phenomena, 
then as it turns out there is no such system. (!e world-dependence of a thought’s existence.)
So far, something on which Frege and Putnam agree. A particular expression, or 
presentation, of a question does not on its own "x what another presentation of the same 
question would be. But while for both Frege and Putnam what thoughts there are is, 
somehow, a world-involving matter, Frege is unlikely to have anticipated Putnam’s take on the 
idea that so is what would count as a presentation of a given thought. Frege had his standards 
on proper de"nition. What he may not have anticipated is that whether, e.g., has momentum 
M is well-de"ned is hostage to how things happen to be. Both agree, though, on this crucial 
point: identifying di#erent presentations of the same question of truth involves extra-logical 
work—the sort of work involved in settling whether two people are disagreeing (or agreeing) 
about the same thing. For Frege, I suggest, it is the fate of such work which requires Sinn-
Bedeutung to be a many-one relation.
But for Frege’s birth there would have been no thoughts about him. Had Venus had a 
di#erent history, there might have been no thought about it in which it was presented as the 
Morning Star. !e world does that much in deciding what thoughts there are. A fortiori there 
are no thoughts about physical quantities without quantities for them to be about. Putnam’s 
point: here, too, it is for the world to decide just what thoughts there therefore are; and just 
how any such thought makes truth turn on how things are. !e way things are is what, in a 
thought, we represent as some way or other. What truth thus comes to turn on is also 
something on which turns just how, in that representing, we made truth turn on it. Such 
world-involvingness of the identity of thoughts lies at the core of Putnam’s response to the 
 idea that laws of logic say nothing. But before seeing how, there is one more step to take.
5. Logic’s Topic: A proposition, for YW, structures elements each of a type to which truth-
preservation is sensitive, insofar as such preservation is part of being true as such. So what 
logic says about, e.g., the relation of a conjunction to its conjuncts applies directly to 
propositions themselves: what is a conjunct, what its conjuncts, can be read directly o# of the 
structure by which these are to be identi"ed. YW’s propositions, however, are not, as we have 
seen, what identify questions of truth as the ones they are. Frege’s thoughts do that. Finding 
conjunctions and conjuncts within Fregean thoughts, though, involves extra-logical work; 
inter alia, working of seeing in just what ways the same thought may be decomposed. Fregean 
thoughts are not each built in a given way from some given stock of building blocks. A 
thought, as opposed to a proposition, is not something to which logic applies in just one way. 
Each law of logic, or tautology, as YW sees things, embodies a particular way for elements in 
a representing to cancel out. !ereby it re%ects the structure of some given system or class of 
systems. A domain of Fregean thoughts, though, does not as such form any such system.
Decompose a thought in some given way and one may arrive at something to which 
laws of logic apply directly. !ere then remains a substantial question: how else that same 
thought might be identi"able. Identify a proposition by the structure conferred on it by its 
derivation in its system, and no such substantial question remains. Each element in a 
decomposition of a thought brings it under a certain generality; presents it as the same as 
some range of thoughts in some given respect. Some such samenesses bring us to that to 
which logic as such is sensitive. What Frege saw as essential to a question of truth, though, is 
that for any given such question, there is no one right way of doing this. A decomposition of a 
thought cannot on its own provide us with a determinate notion of same thought. To which, 
thanks to Putnam, we may add: for any given candidate way of presenting a thought—even by 
stipulation—whether this is a way of presenting that thought, or any thought, is liable to be a 
substantial, sometimes world-involving, matter.
How, then, could logic tell us how one must think to reach the goal truth? How could 
there be such a thing as what follows by logic from what? Well, how do we get from a whole 
thought to a structure to which logic speaks directly? Let the whole thought be that Sid slurps. 
!is decomposes into (roughly) an element which makes the thought one whose truth turns 
on whether Sid is the ways it speci"es, and an element which makes truth turn on whether 
the object it speci"es slurps—as it were into a naming element, making the thought hostage to 
how some given object is, and a predicative element, making it hostage to which objects are 
some speci"ed way—here, such as to slurp. Each of these elements is of a given type, 
instanced in an inde"nite range of other thoughts. !ere is, familiarly, the thought that Sid 
waddles, etc; and there is the thought that Pia slurps, etc. Where there is such a structuring of 
elements, there is also a truth-preserving inference to a related thought with a di#erent 
structure: colloquially, from Sid slurps to someone does. Such is the sort of thing logic tells us.
On what information does the result depend? Logic takes an interest in the occurrence 
of predicative elements, and of naming elements, and in their distribution within a given 
decomposition, or corpus of them. It is not interested in whether a thought is about Sid, nor 
in whether it is about slurping. Whatever is proprietary to such notions is not part of what 
follows from the notion being true as such. It is interested in an element’s recurrence. It 
matters that it is the same way someone is represented both in Sid slurps and in Someone does. 
Whether this happens to be slurping is beside the point.
 Let us call what I have just abstracted from that decomposition of the thought that Sid 
slurps a logical form. Logical forms can serve as logic’s primary interest. We can think of logic 
as generating some "xed stock of them. Each form would be a construction of indexed 
thought-element types, each index marking a distribution of some given element of that type. 
Such a stock of forms would re%ect the most fundamental features of being true as such. !e 
rules for such constructions would generate such structures as, e.g., ones in which some 
concept (more properly what it was a concept of) would be predicated of some object. Laws of 
logic would then be dicta identifying which transitions from some logical forms to others 
were truth-preserving. Logic treats the phenomenon logical form. A standard logical calculus 
presents the details (within its scope) in that special way peculiar to such calculi.
We began from a conception of logic on which the distinctive feature of laws of logic, 
aside from their truth, was their maximal generality, in a sense in which such generality is 
achieved through maximal quanti"cation. On this conception logic speaks to thoughts 
through a reverse process, instantiation—what, on our present conception, would lead to a 
decomposition of a thought; one such among, perhaps, many. So conceiving laws of logic in 
this way is one way to try to capture logic’s topic-neutrality; its having no special subject 
matter.
But we now have another way of conceiving the matter. Such leaves logic both universal 
and topic-neutral. But it does not achieve this by quantifying away from all subject-matter. 
Rather, it achieves this by virtue of the special subject-matter it makes logic’s topic. !at 
special subject-matter is the domain of logical forms. Logic unfolds the notion being true in, 
and by, unfolding the notion logical form.
!is changed conception of logic is occasion once again to consider the idea that being 
true (the notion logic unfolds), like the notion momentum, is made up of many strands. 
Logic’s concern is meant to be something intrinsic to being true itself, hence to any thought. 
Part of that something is now that such-and-such are the logical forms. So, "rst, any thought 
is decomposable into some of these. Second any decomposition of any thought is of some one 
of these. !ird, perhaps, for any form whose constituents are place-holders for thoughts or 
predicative elements thereof, any thoughts or predicative elements (as appropriate) may 
replace those place-holders to form a compound thought. !us, any move from thoughts of a 
given forms to something of a form which follows from these by logic’s laws is a move to a 
thought, moreover one true if these "rst ones are. Only some quantifying, e.g., may preserve 
truth; but all of it preserve being truth-valued. Logic may never lead from thoughts to non-
thoughts.
Logic does not tell us what thoughts have which forms. It is thus far insulated from 
con"rmation or refutation by the way things happen to be. But it unfolds a notion with 
enough independent threads to justify Putnam’s refusal to endorse “metaphysical guarantees 
of the unrevisability of logic.” Logic may "x ‘the form of coherent thought’ as such; in which 
case there is no such thing as thinking something so, not subject to its dictates. Such is what it 
is for logic to be universal. Universality does not shield the question what laws have such 
scope from proving, like laws of momentum, hostage to how things are.
6. Truth’s !reads Revisited: Having pointed out that laws of logic were not laws of holding 
true (when thoughts would be held true), hence not psychological laws, Frege continued, 
 It is because of this that they have authority for our thought if it would 
attain to truth. (1893: xvi)
But, as MW later wrote, neither, equally, is when to count something as being red a matter of 
when it would be held red. (Cf. Zettel: §§429-432) !e facts of what would count as red (or 
green, etc.) hold a certain authority over all thought about colour (or those colours). But it is 
not that special authority logic holds over all thought. Such, then, must have another source.
Objectivity is per se authority external to us. But one can omit attitudes towards colour, 
or at least towards being red or green. !ere is no such opting out of logic’s laws, or none we 
currently understand. Also, while we do understand how the world may reveal what 
momentum really is, we as yet have no idea what it would be for it to reveal to us what (the) 
logical forms really are. Logic holds a special authority over us. Such  cannot derive just from 
the fact that its laws are not psychological.
Frege’s idea was: logic is not just universal, but also ineluctable. !ere is only one thing 
it could have been, no matter what. Logic (for Frege) unfolds what belongs to being true as 
such. To be a thought, for Frege, is just to "x (or be) some given question of truth. (“I place 
the content of the word ‘true in lead position …and I let thoughts follow immediately as that 
by which truth can come into question at all.” (1919: 273) Logic thus could not but be 
universal. Further, if to think is (inter alia) to think thoughts, then logic thus governs all 
thinkers. !ese points do not depend on what logic’s dicta are, or on just what they dictate.
Still, being true is a notion made up of separable threads; as are concomitant notions 
such as logical form. We have seen how such a feature mattered to what momentum is. How 
might it matter here? In search of an answer one might "rst look more closely at the notion 
ineluctable. When Frege tries to imagine not being bound by our familiar laws of logic (see 
1893, xvi), what he thinks of is thinkers who $out these laws. Another idea would be: the 
thoughts they think (or some) are—despite what seems to be just intrinsic to being true as 
such—simply not articulable into those logical forms in terms of which our familiar laws are 
de"ned. So our familiar laws would be, for part of their thinking, at least, not %outed, but 
inapplicable. Here is a new understanding of being ineluctable. !ose laws we know may well 
be inescapable for thought insofar as it articulates into those forms in which the logic we 
know trades, and yet not of force where (if anywhere) thoughts did not assume those logical 
forms for which the laws were designed.
Such an idea "ts with the way in which we have seen YW’s two di#erent ideas of logic’s 
laws as saying nothing come apart. One idea is that these laws say nothing in that their 
elements cancel each other out. We might thus think of logic’s dicta as di#ering from other 
thoughts in that, since their role is to govern any though whatever, no provision has been 
made for them to be hostage in any way to how things turn out to be. In other cases, to put it 
in YW’s terms, lack of provision is within some special system. !at system of Newtonian 
descriptions of mechanical phenomena provides no way for the Newtonian de"nition of 
momentum to prove either false or senseless. It stands within the system as a "xed point. But 
the life of the thought that momentum is mass times velocity is not con"ned to its place in 
any given special system. Logic is a di#erent story. !e universality attaching to its role means 
that in the case of its dicta cancelling out is not just within any special system.
YW’s other idea of saying nothing (6.1222) is: being neither supported, nor called into 
question, by anything experience may show as to how things are. But saying nothing on the 
"rst idea of doing so does not seem to entail saying nothing on this second. Laws which, if 
 laws, hold of all thoughts are plausibly ones whose holding is not hostage in any determinate 
way to what, given them, is liable to be true or not. !ey are precisely what would hold 
independent of the truth-value of such things. YW’s idea of cancelling out is a not implausible 
way of thinking of this sort of insulation from worldly vicissitudes. Such laws, as Putnam’s 
Kant has it, merely limn the form of thought as such (for Frege, of being true as such). But 
what would be so of laws which held cannot, it would seem, by itself select which laws do 
hold. Or not unless the ways in which the world is liable to bear on truth and falsity are 
identi"ed, uniquely, by some structure intrinsic to the domain of thoughts as such—an idea 
which Putnam has certainly given us reason to reject.
Such abstract rumination begins to gain content with our shi$ed understanding of what 
logic is about. Suppose that logic’s laws have an identi"able subject matter: logical forms—not 
what forms given thoughts assume, but what forms there are for thoughts to assume, and how 
these relate to one another. Here there seems, at "rst blush, something for a would-be law to 
get right or wrong. Would not any claim as to what forms there are (in Frege’s phrase) expose 
itself to risk of error—a risk, of course, which some such claims would escape?
But when we look more closely, perhaps such dealing in abstraction is mere word play, a 
%ight of fancy. For what do laws of logic say? What features of being true do they unfold? 
Well, for example, what is truth-valued is either true or false; where which of these it is is 
independent of what we think. !ere are thus an easily surveyable variety of ways for the 
truth-value of a thought to be "xed by the truth-values of others. Logic provides us with 
logical forms corresponding to these ways; and then rules determining how truth is preserved 
in moves from some forms to others. So, for example, logic speaks of a way for a thought to be 
formed from, A&B. It tells us that a move from such a thought to the corresponding thought, 
A, is truth-preserving. Call a thought which assumes this form relative to some thought, A, 
and some thought, B, a conjunction of A and B. Which thoughts are conjunctions of which 
others? Such is not for logic to say. What it does say is when a thought would be a conjunction 
of two others: for a start, when that "rst thought is true just where those two others are. Now 
look at that fact about truth-preservation. How minimal can a fact get and still be one? Such, I 
think, exempli"es the sort of thing laws of logic (viewed one way) say.
But there is more. Logic tells us what logical forms there are: any thought must assume 
some of these. !ese then identify the ways for thoughts to relate logically to one another. 
Moreover, moves which logic tells us preserve truth it also tells us preserve thought-hood. So, 
too, with all ways of compounding thoughts (or making thoughts of predicative elements) 
always preserve thought-hood. So, for example, though identifying thoughts is extra-logical 
work, for any two thoughts, A and B, there is a third, A&B, and a fourth, and etc. Any two 
thoughts can be compounded or disjoined, disjunction distributing over conjunction and 
vice-versa. On the other hand, for a given sort of thought—say, of given water, at a time, that 
it is boiling—there is, on the one hand, the way a thought of that type would represent things 
as being, and there is what it so represents: some particular case, that water’s being as it then 
is. To be able to think water to be that way is to be able to recognise, of particular cases (of 
suitable sort) when they would, when not, be cases of things being the way in question. Such 
exempli"es abilities we have to recognise the obtaining of a relation to which logic does not 
speak: a relation between something governed by its laws, and something—bits of history—
not. Such an ability can at least be exercised as a control on what logic tells us here. Is it really 
so that wherever there is a conjunction of a thought with a disjunction there is a disjunction 
of the conjunction of that thought with each disjunct? Perhaps. But might there not be 
 something here for logic to be hostage to?
We can now understand how Putnam stands in relation to both YW and MW. Putnam 
can accept the universality of logic. Universal is just what it is designed to be. Logic, as Frege 
put it, unfolds the content of the notion being true. A thought is precisely ‘that by which truth 
can come into question at all’. So logic applies to all thoughts. Concern with any thought is 
just its business. !ere is no pressure for things to be otherwise.
Nor need Putnam dissent from YW’s "rst notion of saying nothing. Logic’s concerns 
(truth-preserving) touch one side of the representing-as relation: ways to represent things; 
not (directly) things so to represent. Truth belongs to representation. Normally it is a joint 
product of both sides of that relation: one side makes truth turn in a certain way on the other; 
the other then yields a product of so turning. What represents a law of logic to hold, though, 
cancels out work of that other side; makes truth turn in the null way on it. Or better: it 
provides no way for truth thus to turn. Putnam need not balk at this either.
Putnam must, though, with MW, resist YW’s second account of saying nothing. A 
logical truth, like any thought, represents things as a certain way there is for things to be. 
!ere are things to be understood as to just what way that is. But it is a world-involving 
matter what ways for things to be there are (and what each is). So that what is to be 
understood as to what any given one is is relative to a perspective on it and on the world. 
What is (now) to be understood as a law of logic would be might, from a more revealing 
perspective on the world, be to be understood di#erently, or, perhaps, prove simply 
ununderstandable, as the world has proven to be. Which rules out YW’s idea of absolute 
immunity to worldly bearing. It may belong to a law of logic that for it to hold is for the world 
to be denied a role in deciding that it does. Whether there is such law, or such a thing to hold 
or not, is another matter.
I have here championed one idea of Frege’s at the expense of another. Frege was right, 
and Russell and YW not, about what questions of truth there are, hence about what the truths 
are across which truth is to be preserved. !oughts are distinguished from propositions in the 
room a decomposition leaves for di#erent applications of the notion same thought. Just this 
leaves the space Putnam has charted for the world’s role in "xing what ways there are for 
things to be and how any given one in fact makes truth turn on how things are.
Frege’s proving right on this point, though, brings with it a conception of logic 
decidedly not his. A law, so logic’s, holds. It is neither true nor false. So it is not a thought. But 
it could relate to what it governs as a quanti"cation to its instantiations. For the project 
Begri%sschri" addressed it was important for logic’s laws to do so. On the present view, they 
do not. !ey govern relations between thoughts. But in "rst instance they speak of forms 
abstracted from thoughts. How they apply to given thoughts is thus not "xed until extra-
logical work is done. (Compare the way mechanic’s laws apply to given rigid bodies.)
!is idea of application-at-a-distance is sometimes said just to be our current 
conception of logic; a conception re%ected in that peculiar form of expression of what logic 
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